to overcome current medical challenges involved in blood and tissue preservation.

Recent U.S. military actions have resulted in stationing troops in harsh climates and conditions, such as those experience in Afghanistan. Current locations and missions require new capabilities in combat casualty care, and these capabilities would include stable blood products, organs, and wound repairing tissues that will enhance human survivability under conditions of trauma, shock, anoxia, and other extreme conditions, including extreme environment. The Department of Defense needs to develop tissues with a long shelf life to support combat casualty care. Research in this area could develop stress-tolerant biosystems or tissues that selectively control critical metabolic processes by exploiting an enhanced understanding of differential gene expression in bio-organisms and systems exposed to extreme environ-

Ms. LANDRIEU. The Senator from Maine is quite correct in her observation and assessment that medical treatment, and specifically combat casualty care, particularly in a time of war, should not be overlooked. Further, the Department of Defense must consider all initiatives that could provide our military physicians and medical staff the tools necessary to save the lives of men and women whose service to our Nation puts them at risk of severe injury.

Ms. COLLINS. I am hopeful that as our bill moves through floor consideration and conference with the House, we can work to ensure that this type of research is adequately funded within the Department of Defense.

There are many aspects to consider in taking care of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines who are sent into harm's way. In times like these, preserving the well-being of our men and men in uniform should be given the investment necessary to see that research like this gets to the field.

Ms. LANDRIEU. I thank the distinguished Senator from Maine for highlighting the critical nature of this research. I recognize her interest in this particular area and that this research clearly has potential for saving lives, both military and civilian. I look forward to working with her on this issue as the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization bill moves forward.

Ms. COLLINS. I thank the distinguished chairman for her commitment to support investments in the well-being of a most precious national asset—our men and women in uniform. And I look forward to working with her on this important issue. The support of the chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee will be critical, and welcomed, to see that leading edge medical research is not only explored, but deployed in the days ahead

Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. REID. It is my understanding the Senate is now in morning business; is that right?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

SUPREME COURT DECISION IN ATKINS V. VIRGINIA

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, last week the Supreme Court ruled, in a case called Atkins v. Virginia, that the execution of mentally retarded persons violates the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court thereby reversed its 1989 holding in Penry v. Lynaugh, which it decided at a time when only two States with death penalty laws forbade the execution of the mentally retarded. In Atkins, the Court noted that in the 13 years following Penry, 16 additional States have enacted laws banning such executions. In addition, 12 States do not have the death penalty at all, meaning that a total of 30 States do not permit the execution of the mentally retarded. Therefore, the Court concluded that a "national consensus" has emerged against the execution of the mentally retarded. Because the Court interprets the eighth amendment in accordance with "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," the Court concluded that the emergence of this national consensus rendered such executions unconstitutional.

I applaud the Supreme Court's decision. And I do so not from the perspective of one who opposes the death penalty in all its applications. Rather, I am a supporter of the death penalty. I believe that, when used appropriately, it is an effective crime-fighting tool and a deterrent. Indeed, I am the author of two major Federal crime laws that extended the availability of the death penalty. I authored the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which extended the death penalty to drug kingpins. And I authored the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which extended the death penalty to roughly 60 crimes, including—just to name a few-terrorist homicides, murder of Federal law enforcement officers, large-scale drug trafficking, and sexual abuse resulting in death.

But I believe that when we apply this ultimate sanction—which is, of course, irrevocable—we must do so consistent with the values that we stand for as a nation and as a civilized people. We must be as reasonable, as fair, and as judicious as we possibly can be. And we

must ensure that we reserve the death penalty only for monstrous people who have committed monstrous acts. In short, we must apply the death penalty in a way that is worthy of us as Americans.

That is why I have led the fight to make sure that the Federal death penalty—which I strongly support—does not apply to the mentally retarded. Just as we would not execute a 12-yearold who commits a crime, even though that 12-year-old knows the difference between right and wrong, so we should not execute a mentally retarded person. To be mentally retarded is to be deprived of the ability to comport oneself in a normal way, not because of anything that one did, but because of an accident of birth. We all know families into which children are born who do not have a high enough intelligence quotient to justly and fairly measure their actions against every other person in society. I cannot imagine strapping in a chair someone with an I.Q. of less than 70, with the mental capacity of a 12-year-old—at most—and telling him that he must die for his crimes.

Let me be clear: I do not believe that a mentally retarded criminal is blameless. Far from it. A mentally retarded person, like a child, may well know the difference between right and wrong, and may be able to control his actions. Therefore, I must be clear about one further point. This is not about choosing between executing mentally retarded criminals or letting them roam the streets. That is a false choice. Under the Federal laws that I have authored, as well as under State statutes. we provide for every possible penalty short of death for the mentally retarded, including life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

That was true last week, and it remains true today. The Supreme Court decision does not alter that fact one bit. It remains within our ability—and it remains our duty-to ensure that dangerous mentally retarded criminals are kept far away from law-abiding citizens. We have a host of penalties available to us to ensure that we are able to do so. And we have been doing so effectively. Since the 1989 Penry decision, only five States have resorted to executing mentally retarded persons. The remaining States, as well as the Federal Government, have effectively confined and deterred mentally retarded criminals by means of incarceration

Some people have argued that we must allow executions of the mentally retarded because it is often extremely difficult to define and determine mental retardation. I disagree. That has not been the experience of the States in recent years. More importantly, whether something is difficult to do has no bearing on whether it is the right thing to do. Sparing the lives of mentally retarded criminals is manifestly the right thing to do, regardless of whether it is difficult on the margins. We ask judges and juries to make